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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper will only analyze one issue; namely whether the inclu-
sion of penalty clauses or fixed sums into a contract is governed by the 
Convention of International Sale of Goods (CISG)
1
 and, therefore, falls 
inter alia under Article 74.  In essence, a penalty clause or fixed sum is a 
pre-determined amount of money which becomes due in the event of a 
breach of contract.  The word “penalty” is used in this paper to describe 
the fact that the amount due is greater than the actual damage.  The main 
reasons to include penalty clauses in contracts are to “reduce legal costs, 
[to provide] time for producing evidence, and [to mitigate] the risk of 
losing litigation or arbitral proceedings due to the required level of proof 
                                               
*Dr. Bruno Zeller: Associate Professor, Victoria University; Adjunct Professor, 
Murdoch University School of Law – Perth; Associate, The Institute for Logistics and 
Supply Chain Management.  I wish to thank Weidi Long of Wuhan University for his 
helpful comments on an earlier draft.  This work is dedicated to Al Kritzer of Pace Uni-
versity, a very good friend and mentor. 
1 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 
11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter CISG]. 
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not being met.”2 
It is undisputed that the CISG does not expressly address the issue 
of penalty clauses; therefore, the question is whether general principles 
within the CISG will lead to a solution on this point.
3
 It is argued in this 
paper that if a fixed sum equals the actual damages, such a sum would be 
enforced; thus, the issue is not the fixing of an amount, but rather the 
amount itself. 
It is understood that the CISG is an autonomous legislation devoid 
of words with domestic connotations and, therefore, the common law 
distinction between penalty clauses and liquidated damages does not ap-
ply.
4
  However, a discussion of the common law, as well as selected civil 
law positions, is still of value in order to understand Article 4 of the 
CISG because the Convention does not apply when it comes to “the va-
lidity of the contract or any of its provisions.”5  Additionally, some arbi-
trators have argued that Article 6 of the CISG suggests that the inclusion 
of a penalty clause will be tantamount to an implied exclusion of the 
CISG on this point.
6
  Further consideration will be given to the general 
principle of freedom of contract, which is an important concept through-
out the CISG.  
This article will argue that penalty clauses are covered by the CISG 
and many courts, tribunals, and commentaries have taken far too narrow 
a view.  An examination of the general principles, as laid down within  
the CISG, will lead to the conclusion that penalty clauses are within the 
ambit of the CISG.  
II.  PENALTY CLAUSES IN DOMESTIC LAW 
Australian law provides the aggrieved party with two causes of ac-
tion to recover the penalty clause: an action on a debt and an action for 
damages.
7
  The main advantage of an action on a debt is that such an ac-
                                               
2 Pascal Hachem, Fixed Sums in CISG Contracts, 13 VINDOBONA J. INT‟L COM. L. & 
ARB. 217, 218 (2009). 
3 E. Allan Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 247, 248 
(1979). 
4 For a full treatment on this point, see Bruno Zeller, Four-Corners  – The Metho-
dology for Interpretation and Application of the UN Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods (May 2003) (Ph.D. thesis, University of Melbourne), available 
at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/bib-lio/4corners.html. 
5 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 4.   
6 See Bruno Zeller, The CISG And The Opting Out Clause Pursuant To Article 6: A 
Corrective Reply, 20 (8) MEALEY‟S INT‟L ARB. REP. 1-6 (2005).  
7 JEANNIE PATERSON ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW, ch. 28 (2d ed. 2005).  
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol23/iss1/1
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tion “may not be dependent on a breach of contract ... [and] [p]roof of 
loss is not required.”8   
However, the action under a contract is contingent on the fact that 
the penalty clause is deemed to be a liquidated damages claim and not  
penal in nature, in which case the  clause would be unenforceable.
9
  In 
such situations, a conflict arises between the freedom of contract and the 
need for judicial interference to set aside what parties bargained for.  In 
essence, the law is concerned about protecting the debtor rather than the 
freedom of contract and party autonomy.  In Ringrow Pty. Ltd. V. BP 
Austl. Pty. Ltd. (Ringrow), the court noted that the law on penalty is an 
exception to the general rule.
10
  The court stated on this point, “the pro-
pounded penalty must be judged „extravagant and unconscionable in 
amount‟.  It is not good enough that it should be lacking in proportion.  It 
must be „out of all proportion.‟”11 
The principles upon which Ringrow relied were developed in Dun-
lop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd., in which 
Lord Dunedin ruled, “[i]t will be held to be a penalty if the sum stipu-
lated for is extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison 
with the greatest loss that could be conceivably be proved to have fol-
lowed from the breach.”12  On the other hand, Lord Dunedin also stated: 
It is no obstacle to the sum stipulated being a genuine pre-estimate of dam-
age that the consequences of the breach are such as to make precise pre-
estimation almost an impossibility. On the contrary, that is just the situation 
when it is probable that pre-estimated damage was the true bargain between 
the parties.13 
The problem with this approach is that the court must interpret the 
intent of the parties at the time  the contract was formed.  Under the 
common law, the parol evidence rule only addresses facts using an objec-
tive approach.
14
  Background information from pre-contractual negotia-
tions is ignored, as it is generally rejected as not falling within the objec-
                                               
8 CHRISTOPHER LAWRENCE & EDMUND BARTON CHAMBERS, PENALTY CLAUSES IN 
AGREEMENTS: ENFORCEMENT AND AVOIDANCE 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.ebc44.com/articles/Lawrence_18_March_2009.pdf. 
9 Id. 
10 See Ringrow Pty. Ltd. v. BP Austl. Pty. Ltd. [2005] 224 CLR 656, 669 (Austl.). 
11 Id. 
12 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v New Garage & Motor Co. Ltd., [1915] A.C. 79 
(H.L.) 87 (Appeal taken from Eng.).  
13 Id. at 87-88.  
14 See generally Bruno Zeller, The Parol Evidence Rule and the CISG – A Compara-
tive Analysis, 36 COMP. INT‟L L. J. OF S. AFR. 3 (2003). 
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The questions left unanswered by Ringrow was whether the liqui-
dated damages clause is “exclusive” or if the court deems the clause to 
be penal in nature and whether the right to damages is lost.  The issue is 
that the clause ab initio is not invalid.  It only becomes unenforceable 
should the court finds that it is a penalty and not liquidated damages.  
This treatment of penalty clauses contradicts German law, which 
gives penalty clauses full effect.
8
  However, Article 343 of the German 
Civil Code (BGB) allows the breaching party to advance arguments that 
the court should reduce the penalty amount to a “reasonable amount by 




Despite the substantial differences between common law and civil 
law, as well as German law in particular, in practice these differences are 
significantly reduced.
18
  Arguably, the German approach is far simpler 
and provides more certainty to contractual parties.  Simply put, the 
breaching party is forced to pay the agreed sum or the plaintiff may only 
receive what the court determines are “actual” damages.  
However, it appears that common law courts, on one hand, are not 
prepared to amend the effects of a poor bargain as “„men of business‟ … 
[enter contracts] with their eyes open,”19 but on the other hand, the courts 
are prepared to assist with poor bargains related to penalty clauses.  Ar-
guably, the risk allocation between contracting parties, which is in “bal-
ance” at the formation of the contract, is disturbed once a contract con-
taining a penalty clause is breached.  The problem with the common law 
approach is highlighted in Piggott Foundations v. Shepherd Construc-
tion, in which the breaching party was only held liable for the amount of 
liquidated damages despite the fact that the actual damages were far 
                                               
15 See generally, Bruno Zeller, Determining the Contractual Intent of Parties under 
the CISG and the Common Law – A Comparative Analysis, 4 EUR. J.L. REFORM 629 
(2002). 
 
16 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], Jan. 2, 2002, Bundesgesetzblatt 
[BGBL.] I, 343, as amended (Ger.), translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#BGBen-gl_000P343 
17 See Unfair Contract Terms Act; France Art. 1152 CC; Germany § 343 CC 
('BGB'). 
18 See BASIL MARKESINIS, HANNES UNBERATH & ANGUS JOHNSTON, THE GERMAN 
LAW OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 444 (2d ed. 2006). 
19 Thomas Thompson, A Fresh Look at Liquidated Damages, 22 CONSTRUCTION L.J. 
289, 295 (2006). 
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greater.
20
  If the clause had been judged to be penal in nature, the clause 
would have been unenforceable and, therefore, the claimant could have 
relied on a claim for damages, which would have been equal to the actual 
loss.  It could be argued that an astute contractual party will always over-
estimate damages because, in that event, they party may be compensated 
for actual damages.    Conversely, if the damages are underestimated, no 
recourse is possible, which is not a very satisfactory solution for main-
taining certainty.    
III.  THE CISG AND PENALTY CLAUSES  
Literature and case law on this issue is sparse, which suggests that 
the question of penalty clauses has not created great controversy.  How-
ever, the debate still surfaces from time to time and usually two articles, 
Article 4 and Article 6, are used in an attempt to explain why penalty 
clauses are not part of the CISG. 
21
 
The problem with this approach is that focusing on one article alone 
does not take the full scope of the CISG into consideration.  Within the 
four corners of the Convention, general principles are the glue that hold 
the individual provisions together.  To that end, Articles 7 and 8 are the 
key to unlocking the Convention and provide the methodology to finding 
and applying general principles.  Just because the CISG does not expli-
citly include an issue, to automatically exclude it from the scope of the 
Convention is inappropriate.  It can be argued that exclusion is only me-
rited when the matter is either expressly excluded by a provision or is not 
contained within a general principle as noted in Article 7. 
A.  Article 6 
Some commentators have argued that the inclusion of a penalty 
clause automatically means that Article 6 is applicable and an implied 
opt-out of the CISG has taken place.
22
 However,  these arguments are pa-
tently wrong.  Courts and scholars clearly state that an implied opt-out is 
only possible in extreme cases.
23
  In one case, the French Supreme Court 
                                               
20 See Pigott Founds. Ltd. v. Shepherd Constr. Ltd., [1993] 67 B.L.R. 48, 51 (Eng.). 
21 See Marcus S. Jacobs & Yanming Huang, An Arbitrator’s Powers And Duties 
Under Art 114 Of Chinese Contract Law In Awarding Damages In China In Respect of A 
Dispute Under A Contract Governed By CISG, MEALEY‟S INT‟L ARB. REP., May 2005. 
22 Id. at 42. 
23 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & INGEBORG SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN 
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 112 (Ingeborg Schwenzer, 
3d ed.  2010).   
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applied the French Civil Code despite the applicability of the CISG.
24
  In 
that case, the Convention was ignored, which is a common problem.  The 
court noted: 
In so ruling, although the pleading invoked the provisions of both the Civil 
Code and the Vienna Convention, and because [the Court] could not find 
thereupon that the parties voluntarily excluded application of the Vienna 
Convention, the Court of Appeal violated the above laws . . . . [The Su-
preme Court] REVERSES and ANNULS in its entirety the judgment ren-
dered by the Court of Appeal of Bordeaux on 15 October 2007 regarding 
the [above-mentioned] parties. [The Supreme Court] orders the cause of ac-
tion and the parties to be reinstated in the position where they were prior to 
the above-mentioned judgment, and in the interest of justice, orders the 
Court of Appeal of Bordeaux to hold a new trial before a new tribunal.25 
This case clearly indicates that unless both parties expressly exclude 
either the CISG in its entirety or “derogate from or vary the effects of 
any of its provisions,”26 a court is reluctant to read an implied derogation 
into a contract.
27
  Before an opt-out of the CISG can take place, pursuant 
to Article 6, either express intent must be present or the matter is not go-
verned by the CISG and, thus, a gap exists, which must be filled by do-
mestic law.  
The problem is that the above argument is only valid at the choice 
of law stage.  The CISG is clearly an “opt- out” Convention,; that is, it 
will apply automatically pursuant to Article 1 in its entirety unless it is 
expressly excluded or varied pursuant to Article 6.
28
  
It follows that Article 6 has another function; the CISG may be 
treated as the putative governing law and its own terms shall determine 
the outcome of any disputed matter. If a contractual term fixes a sum 
which exceeds the damages allowed under Article 74, the doctrine of 
freedom of contract found in Article 6 will resolve this issue.  Article 6 
specifically allows parties to “derogate from or vary the effects of any of 
its provisions,”29 which includes Article 74.  In effect, the penalty clause 
                                               
24 Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters], Nov. 3, 2009, Bull. 
Civ. IV, No. T 08-12.399 (Fr.), translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/091103f1.html. 
25 Id. 
26 CISG, supra note 1, art. 6. 
27 Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] com., Nov. 3, 2009, 
Bull. Civ. IV, No. T 08-12.399 (Fr.), translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/091103f1.html.  
28 SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 23, at 193. 
29 CISG, supra note 1, art. 6. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol23/iss1/1
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has varied the effects of Article 74 by allowing excess sums to be 
claimed.  The mere presence of a penalty clause invokes Article 6 with-
out a need to either expressly, or by implication, invoke the right to “de-
rogate from or vary the effects of any of its provisions.”30  
B.  Article 4  
An investigation into whether penalty clauses are not governed by 
the CISG logically starts with Article 7, the interpretative article.  Article 
7(1), in brief, promotes “uniformity in its application and the observance 
of good faith in international trade.”31  The effect of this provision is that 
all matters covered by the CISG cannot be interpreted using domestic le-
gal principles or rules. Simply put, all matters which are expressly settled 
within the CISG may not be settled using domestic laws or interpretive 
principles.  However, it must be noted that the CISG does not cover all 
areas of sales law and, thus, gaps need to be filled by recourse to domes-
tic law applicable by “virtue of the rules of private international law.”32 
Gaps may either be matters not settled within the CISG or issues 
expressly excluded from the CISG.  However, Article 7(2) notes that 
some “matters are governed by this Convention which are not expressly 
settled.”33  These matters are to be governed by general principles upon 
which the matter is based.  The CISG does not expressly mention penalty 
clauses,
34
 hence, they are not expressly excluded from nor included in the 
CISG.  Therefore, pursuant to Article 7(2), the next step is to determine 
which general principle penalty clauses would fall under, which requires 
investigation to ascertain whether the particular issue is a general prin-
ciple found within the CISG.
35
   
Penalty clauses are only applicable if a party is in breach of the con-
tract; hence, they form part of the compensation regime available to the 
aggrieved party. Penalty clauses are compensatory in nature and the 
CISG contains such a regime.  In other words, a consequence of the 
breach is the enlivenment of the clause, which falls under Article 74.  
Penalty clauses are calculated to recuperate damages once a breach oc-
curs.  
                                               
30 Id. 
31 For a full treatment of Article 7, see Zeller, supra note 4, at ch. 6.  
32 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2). 
33 See id. 
34 A penalty clause for the purpose of this paper is a clause where the stated amount 
is above actual damages. 
35 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2) 
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There is, however, an exception to this argument; specifically, in 
situations where the applicable governing domestic law declares a con-
tract invalid if it contains a penalty clause. In such cases, Article 4 must 
be consulted.   The first sentence of this article states that the CISG “go-
verns the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations 
of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.”36  This imme-
diately suggests that Article 7 must  be applied, not only to ascertain 
what is included in the Convention, but also to assist in defining what the 
CISG excludes explicitly or by implication.  When Article 4 is tested, 
with the aid of Article 7, a tribunal or court could apply validity of con-
tract in two ways.  
First, validity could be interpreted and, hence excluded, according 
to the same generally accepted criteria such as illegality, immorality, and 
capacity.  Second, validity can only be excluded from the Convention if, 
through the gap-filling procedure, recourse to domestic law must be 
sought.  Enderlein and Maskow believe that “national law on validity 
will not apply when the CISG provides a functionally adequate solution 
to the problem which has been settled nationally by questioning the va-
lidity of the contract.”37  The broadest argument is that if there is a gen-
eral principle contained in the CISG, the Convention would prevail in the 
case of conflict, thus restricting the application of Article 4 of the CISG 
as envisaged by Enderlein and Maskow.  Schlechtriem put the issue very 
succinctly when he noted: 
What amounts to invalidity has to be analysed … “autonomously” i.e., as a 
concept of the CISG interpreted according to the guidelines of Article 7(1). 
In order to preserve or achieve a uniform application of the term “validity,” 
it is not the words used in domestic law and their interpretation under do-
mestic law, but the functions of the respective rules and provisions that are 
decisive . . . . 38 
French and German law does not declare contracts invalid due to 
penalty clauses.  Hence, in these two domestic legal systems, Article 4 is 
not enlivened.  A problem exists under common law since penalty claus-
es are unenforceable.  However, “unenforceable” is not to be confused 
with “invalidity.”  The clause containing a sum of money to be paid in 
                                               
36 Id. art. 4. 
37 FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, 
CONVENTION ON THE LIMITATION PERIOD IN THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 41 
(1992). 
38 COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
(CISG) 65-66 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol23/iss1/1
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case of a breach of the contract is enforceable and thus valid. It is only 
the stated amount, which is unenforceable, but not the underlying prin-
ciple of compensation because the clause is still valid.  Otherwise, no 
rights to damages would exist.  It is, therefore, argued that even under 
common law, Article 4 is not applicable.  Honnold argued correctly that 
“the substance rather than the label” of the domestic rule of validity is 
relevant.
39
  Honnold states: 
Validity is not excluded in total as [A]rticle 4 clearly stipulates that domes-
tic law applies only to validity issues, which are not expressly stated within 
the Convention, (except as otherwise expressly provided in the Conven-
tion).  The answer is clear if article 7(2) in relation to gap filling is con-
sulted.  If the CISG governs matters but not exclusively, then general prin-
ciples will aid in the construction and interpretation of these matters within 
the "Four Corners" of the CISG.  Validity is only excluded if it is not re-
lated to either the formation or rights and obligations of buyers and sel-
lers.40 
One of the rights and obligations of the buyer and seller is to pay or 
to receive compensation for the breach of contract such as damages.  If 
the common law and civil law approaches are analyzed again, it is ob-
vious that it is not the clause, but the sum itself, which is the focus of di-
verse judgments.  In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company, Lord Dunedin 
states “[i]t is no obstacle to the sum stipulated being a genuine pre-
estimate of damage.”41  The CISG does not expressly govern the issue of 
whether a sum is penal in nature or not, however, it does govern the issue 
of damages, which is the underlying reason to stipulate a sum of money 
be paid in case of breach of contract.
42
  
In sum, Article 4 is not applicable and the distinction between li-
quated damages and penalty clauses is not a feature of the CISG.  Any 
pre-estimate of losses is an agreed sum to cover damages in case of a 
breach of contract.  It complies not only with the general principle of 
compensation for losses, but also with the principle of party autonomy.  
                                               
39 JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 115 (2d ed. 1991). 
40 Zeller, supra note 4, ch. 6(4).   
41 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage & Motor Co. Ltd., [1914] UKHL 
1, [1915] A.C. 79 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1914/1.html. 
42 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 74. 
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C.  Article 74 
It is a general principle of contract law that a party is bound by the 
terms of the contract unless a term is invalid or unenforceable.  As noted 
above, invalidity does not apply in this case since the issue of remedies 
for damages is governed by the CISG under Article 74 in conjunction 
with Article 6.  
The first sentence of Article 74 limits the claim to the “sum equal to 
the loss, including loss of profit.”43 It could be argued that this sentence 
limits the damages to the actual loss suffered.  However, the second sen-
tence indicates that the damage cannot exceed “the loss which the party 
foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract.”44  ,Therefore, Article 74 fulfils two functions.  Article 74‟s 
first sentence addresses situations where the contract simply is silent on 
the consequences of a breach of contract.
45
  It is declaratory in character 
and merely indicates that losses also include loss of profit.  However, the 
second sentence of the CISG caps the losses to the sum, which the party 
ought to have foreseen “at the time of the conclusion of the contract.” 46 
Furthermore, in order to assist in determining what was foreseen by 
the parties Article 8 must also be consulted.  Article 8 allows the court or 
tribunal to examine pre-contractual, contractual, as well as post-
contractual conduct in ascertaining the intent of the parties.
47
 The appli-
cation of subjective, as well as objective intent, pursuant to Article 8, al-
lows one to determine whether the party in breach knew or ought to have 
known the consequences of the breach.  The Supreme Court of Austria 
stated: 
From Art[icle] 74 [of the]CISG arises the necessity to determine to what 
degree a reasonable person within the meaning of Art[icle] 8(3) [of 
the]CISG in the circumstances known to [seller] at the time of the conclu-
sion of the contract could (or should) foresee such problems and expenses; 
and if need be, also whether or to what degree such damages (in this man-
ner determinable, foreseeable, exceeding the loss, and resulting directly 
from [seller]'s breach of contract) of [buyer] were actually foreseeable for 
[seller] at the time of conclusion of the contract.48 





47 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8. 
48 Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Jan. 14, 2002, 7 Ob 301/01t, 
Entscheidungen des österreichischen Obersten Gerichthofes in Zivilsachen [SZ] 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol23/iss1/1
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The best indication of foreseeability of loss is achieved by including 
a term in the contract stipulating a sum of money.  The Austrian Supreme 
Court
49
 noted this by indicating: 
The obligor must reckon with the consequences that a reasonable person in his sit-
uation (Art. 8(2) CISG) would have foreseen considering the particular circums-
tances of the case. Whether he actually did foresee this is as insignificant as 
whether there was fault. Yet, subjective risk evaluation cannot be completely ig-
nored: if the obligor knows that a breach of contract would produce unusual or un-
usually high losses, then these consequences are imputable to him.50 
It simply follows that by including a fixed sum into a contract the 
subjective risk evaluation, and hence, the problem of having to defend a 
possibly unusually high loss is alleviated.  Hence, it can be argued that 
Article 8, together with Article 74, leads to the conclusion that penalty 
clauses as such are included within the general principles of the CISG 
and are enlivened in the two articles.  
Regarding the issue of whether penalty clauses can be moderated, 
the Appellate Court of Arnhem stated “Article 8 . . . is about the interpre-
tation of the intent of a party. That is no basis for moderation . . . . There-
fore this question must be answered according to German law.”51 
The court correctly noted that there is no basis for moderation in Ar-
ticle 8, but incorrectly relied on German Law.  Article 8 does not supply 
a cause for moderation because the intent of the parties establishes 
whether a penalty clause should apply.  Hence, a court must uphold con-
tractual terms where the intent of the parties is clear.  To rely on German 
law is not appropriate because Article 4 of the CISG does not apply, as 
the term is not invalid.  
In contrast, in the Foam Board Machinery case,
52
 the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Court of Arbitration went 
further, agreeing that not only actual damages, but also the penalty clause 
can be claimed: 
At issue was seller's right to the compensation fee plus damages. Seller's 
position was, the compensation fee is “a price, a consideration other than in 
                                                                                                         
(Austria), translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020114a3.html. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Franco Ferrari & Albert H. Kritzer, Editorial Remarks, CISG CASE 
PRESENTATION: Diepeveen-Dirkson v. Nieuwenhoven Veehandel (Aug. 15, 2005), 
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950822n1.html. 
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addition to damages suffered.” Advising that the contract clause at issue 
has to be interpreted in accordance with the CISG and “in conformity with 
the general principles on which it is based” as provided in Article 7, the tri-
bunal reasoned that: [T]here is evidence that the compensation fee also 
“has a nature different from damages in compensation of a loss . . . .” Seller 
is entitled to the compensation fee in addition to damages pursuant to Ar-
ticle 74.53 
The court made a distinction between penalty clauses and ordinary 
damages.
54
  Whether an interpretation of the CISG leads to this conclu-
sion is debatable.  However, an examination of the contract, pursuant to 
Article 8, may well have led the arbitral tribunal to the decision that both 
penalties and damages can be claimed.  
In another ICC case, the arbitrator, “[c]iting Article 53 CISG (con-
firming the obligation by the buyer „to pay the price for the goods . . . 
under the conditions provided by the Contract‟) and in other relevant ar-
ticles . . .  held that seller is entitled to recover the penalty set forth in the 
contract.”55 
Simply put, the parties clearly assumed the risk of incurring the 
stated damages in the event of a breach of contract.  The real issue is 
whether the courts and tribunals are inclined to read the CISG in a such a 
way to find recourse in domestic law or a solution within the Conven-
tion‟s general principles.  
This view finds support in the notion that loss of profit, as stated in 
Article 74, also allows compensation for loss of goodwill and reputation, 
which of course needs to equate to a loss of turnover.  As with the term 
“penalty clause,” the terms of “goodwill and reputation “are not express-
ly stated in any of the Convention‟s provisions.  Goodwill and reputation 
are part of second line losses because they do not flow directly from the 
breach of contract, but are a result of it.
56  
It is foreseeable that a busi-
nessperson would use the goods either directly or indirectly to generate a 
profit for his or her business.  Hence, goodwill and reputation are items, 
which fall under “loss of profit” and are covered by the CISG.  
                                               
53 Albert H. Kritzer, Editorial Remarks, CISG CASE PRESENTATION: Foamed 
Board Machinery Case (It. v. Fi.), Case No. 7585 of 1992 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.)(Mar. 20, 
2007), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/-927585i1.html. 
54 See id. 
55 Albert H. Kritzer, Case Digest, CISG CASE PRESENTATION, Chemical Com-
pound Case (Ro. v. Nl.), Case No. 8247 of 1996 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.) (Feb. 15, 2007), 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/968247i1.html 
56 See BRUNO ZELLER, DAMAGES UNDER THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 123 (2005). 
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Goodwill and penalty clauses do have a common denominator, 
namely they form part of the overall calculation of damages.  Article 
7.4.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles may be used as guidance in defining 
the scope of Article 74 to include “any gain of which [the aggrieved par-
ty] has been deprived as a consequence of the non performance . . .  and 
must be understood in a wide sense . . . [and] may cover a reduction in 
the aggrieved party‟s assets or an increase in its liabilities.”57  Therefore, 
Article 74 may be used as “long arm” instrument to recover damages that 
have gone beyond the confines of a breach between two parties since it 
promotes full compensation.  Hence, the reach of Article 74 can be ex-
tended to downstream or upstream relationships that are affected by the 
breach of the contract.
58
 
The fact is that Article 74 covers a wide range of losses which are 
“equal to the loss” and are a “consequence of the breach.”59  It can be ar-
gued that Article 74 does not allow losses to exceed the actual amount.  
However, the CISG does not only consist of one general principle, but 
several.  The issue is that it would be against the spirit of the CISG to 
look at an issue such as penalty clauses and only look at one principle to 
resolve the problem when the issue at hand traverses several general 
principles.  
The issue of penalty clauses are governed by two principles.  If the 
amount of the contractual clause is judged to be more than the actual 
damages, the excess can be accommodated within the CISG as 
representing the maxim of party autonomy as stated in Article 6 and the 
fact that contractual clauses must be given force of law unless they fall 
under Article 4 of the Convention. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Any investigation of a matter, which is not explicitly governed by 
the CISG, should be commenced by keeping the words of Honnold in 




It is irrelevant whether the common law distinguishes between pe-
                                               
57 INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF 
INT'L COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS Art. 7.4.2, at 234 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/-
integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf. 
58 See Zeller, supra note 4, at 125. 
59 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.  
60 Honnold, supra note 39, at 115. 
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nalty clauses and liquidated damages, or that Germany does not make a 
distinction at all.  Making a comparison would amount to an ethnocentric 
approach, which is not allowed pursuant to Article 7(1) of the CISG and 
has been discredited.  Of importance is whether a matter, which is not 
expressly settled by the Convention, falls within one of its several gener-
al principles.  Penalty clauses are such an issue and this paper demon-
strates that penalty clauses may be accommodated by two of the CISG‟s 
general principles, namely freedom of contract and compensation for 
losses.  Furthermore, Schlechtriem, among others,  has noted that Article 
4 of the Convention does not apply since penalty clauses are covered by 
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